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The Word that Cannot be Spoken: Notes From Jurisprudential Underground
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abstract: The Word that Cannot be Spoken: Notes From Jurisprudential Underground
American law reviews have banished a word. Call it Tabooism. When authors today refer to
Tabooism, they flippantly denounce it as irrational, nihilistic, dishonest, and so forth. Even so,
some scholars occasionally discuss Taboo themes without acknowledging their origins.
Sometimes, an author’s efforts to avoid mentioning Tabooism border on the comical. In fact, the
widespread albeit clandestine reliance on Taboo themes and insights suggests that Tabooism
does not deserve its banishment. Why, then, do so many scholars summarily dismiss it? The
primary answer is power. Tabooism threatens central mainstream concepts that many people
cherish: the independent and self-reliant subject who is a sovereign center of control; the
grounding of truth and knowledge on objective foundations; the fairness of our society in
allocating rewards based on merit. When originalists, neoliberals, and other critics shove
Tabooism underground, they bolster their own claims to being pronouncers of objective truths
and unimpeachable principles. We end up discussing absurd questions such as whether
constitutional interpretation should focus on the framers’ intentions or the original public
meaning of the document. But Tabooism can give us a language that would facilitate dialogue,
that would encourage us to focus on pressing issues related to power, inequality, freedom,
democracy, and globalization.
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The Word that Cannot be Spoken: Notes From Jurisprudential Underground

American law reviews have banished a word. This word is neither offensive nor profane.
Depending on context, it previously had signified an era, a cultural concept, or a philosophical
theory, but regardless, it can no longer be spoken—or more precisely, written. This word, this
era, this concept, this theory, has become taboo.
Its banishment presents a problem for me as the author of this essay. I wish to explain this
thing, its importance and its fate, but I cannot say it. To write this essay, then, I need a
placeholder. A number of options are possible. My first thought was to use Voldemort, the name
of the archvillain in the Harry Potter fantasy series. Characters in these novels constantly refer to
Voldemort as “You-Know-Who” or “He-Who-Must-Not-Be-Named.”1 Only the most powerful,
like Professor Dumbledore, or the most courageous, like Harry, use Voldemort’s proper name. If
I had opted for Voldemort, I would need to refer to Voldemortism, Voldemortity, and the like.
These are mouthfuls, but the major drawback of Voldemort is that he is an evil antagonist. While
many might disagree with me, I believe it would be misleading to suggest that my subject matter
is evil or antagonistic.
Eventually, I decided to use the term, Taboo, as my placeholder.2 Taboo spotlights the
widespread current attitude toward this subject matter. The academic legal community largely
forbids discussions and invocations of Tabooism. It has been driven underground or, perhaps,
more precisely, below the line. If you are still uncertain about what Taboo stands for, then look
below the footnote line. The notes to this essay openly use the forbidden word because, after all,
who cares what scurries around below the line (well, maybe some law review editors care).3 A
______________________________
1

J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Goblet of Fire 141-42, 593, 595 (2000); J.K. Rowling, Harry Potter and

the Socrcerer’s Stone 11 (1997).

2

See Mary Douglas, Purity and Danger (1966) (studying taboo rituals).

3

The banished word is ‘postmodern’ (and its derivatives, such as postmodernism and postmodernity). For

characterizations of postmodernism, see Stephen M. Feldman, American Legal Thought From Premodernism to

Postmodernism: An Intellectual Voyage 37-45, 137-87 (2000) [hereinafter Feldman, Voyage]; Fredric Jameson,
Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (1991); Nancey Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity

-2simple Westlaw search through the ‘Law Reviews & Journals’ database revealed that flagship
journals now rarely publish articles with Taboo or its derivatives in the title. As a comparison,
flagship journals published seventy-four such articles from 1992 to 2001, the heyday for open
discussions of Tabooism. But from 2007 to 2016, the number dropped dramatically to only
thirteen articles. In fact, from 2012 forward, only two such articles have been published.4 As an
empirical matter, the prohibition on Tabooism has been extremely effective.
When a writer today mentions Taboo or its derivatives (for example, Tabooism), the
word typically connotes opprobrium. Taboo is anathema. We see this denunciatory labeling of
Taboo in a variety of sources, not only in legal scholarship but also in popular media and
Supreme Court opinions. In the law reviews, Douglas Laycock dismissed a Taboo “world in
which no text or symbol has any core meaning and any text can mean anything.”5 Robert F.
Cochran condemned Tabooism for slouching “toward nihilism.”6 Legal historian James Hackney
referenced “some fanciful [Taboo] notion [in which] there are no scientific truths.”7 In a book
review, James Q. Whitman criticized the author merely for relying too heavily on a Tabooist,
Michel Foucault.8 In other media, conservative columnist Jonah Goldberg condemned President
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(1997).

4

The numbers change, of course, if one accounts for secondary journals and for articles that discuss

postmodernism without using it in the title. Also, the numbers change if one includes articles published with the
word, deconstruction, and its derivatives in the title. Nevertheless, the point is the same: As an empirical matter, law
reviews now rarely publish articles that focus on and overtly discuss postmodernism.

5

Douglas Laycock, Government-Sponsored Religious Displays: Transparent Rationalizations and
Expedient Post-Modernism, 61 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1211, 1248 (2011).

6

Robert F. Cochran, Jr. Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and
Alternate Sources of Virtue, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 307, 333 (2000).

7

James Hackney,

(2003);

The “End” Of: Science, Philosophy, and Legal Theory, 57 U. Miami L. Rev. 629, 636

see Robert F. Cochran, Jr. Professionalism in the Postmodern Age: Its Death, Attempts at Resuscitation, and

Alternate Sources of Virtue, 45 S.D. L. Rev. 307, 333 (2000) (denouncing postmodernism as being nihilistic).
8

James Q. Whitman,

The Free Market and the Prison, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1212, 1219-21, 1224-25, 1229-30

(2012) (reviewing Bernard E. Harcourt, The Illusion of Free Markets: Punishment and the Myth of Natural Order
(2011));

see Brian Leiter, Books in Review, in ABA Divsion for Public Education Focus on Law Studies 14, 14 (Fall

1998) (condemning postmodernists for their “sophomoric jargon”). For a list of additional articles labeling
postmodernism in denunciatory terms, see Reza Dibadj,

377, 377, 408 (2007).

Postmodernism, Representation, Law, 29 U. Haw. L. Rev.

-3Obama as a Tabooist.9 Goldberg explained: “[Tabooism] was and is an enormous intellectual
hustle in which left-wing intellectuals take crowbars and pick axes to anything having to do with
the civilizational Mount Rushmore of Dead White European Males.”10 According to Goldberg,
“the deep dishonesty” of Tabooism threatens truth, rightness, and the American way of life.11
And it is not only conservatives who issue such denunciations. In the liberal magazine, American
Prospect, Chris Mooney equated Tabooism with “fact-free discourse.”12 Meanwhile, in a dissent
to the Supreme Court’s same-sex marriage decision, Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice Alito
denigrated the majority’s interpretation of Due-Process liberty as having “a distinctively [Taboo]
meaning.”13
Of course, the widespread denunciation and dismissal of Tabooism raises a crucial
question: Why do so many writers condemn Tabooism? This essay answers this question. Part I
explains how Tabooism is occasionally manifested in legal scholarship despite its banishment.
Part II explores the reasons for the banishment. Part III, the conclusion, discusses why legal
scholars should again openly discuss Tabooism.
I. The Clandestine Manifestation of Tabooism
Most critics invoke Tabooism as no more than a “four-letter word.”14 When explicitly
mentioned, it is immediately denounced as nonsense, unconstrained relativism, nihilism, and the
like. Even so, many current scholars rely on Taboo insights and themes, often apparently without
realizing they are doing so. To be fair, one reason for that lack of awareness arises from the
nature of Tabooism itself: Many of its primary themes are drawn from earlier intellectual
______________________________
9

Jonah Goldberg, Obama, the postmodernist, USA Today, Aug. 5, 2008, at 11A.

10

Id.

11

Id.

12

Chris Mooney, The Reality Gap, American Prospect, July/Aug. 2011, at 18, 18; see Kevin Mattson, The
Book of Liberal Virtues, American Prospect, Feb. 2006, at 28, 28 (condemning conservatives as postmodern).

13

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015).

14

Dibadj,

supra

note 8, at 389.

-4movements. For instance, Tabooists break down disciplinary boundaries and emphasize
interdisciplinary work.15 To be sure, academic disciplines can provide useful methods of
research, but from the Taboo standpoint, that reason alone is insufficient to limit one’s
scholarship to only one such method. Tabooism, though, is neither the first nor the only form of
legal scholarship to emphasize interdisciplinary methods. The Legal Realists of the 1920s and
1930s were renowned for their reliance on social-science methods.16 Regardless, nowadays,
interdisciplinary scholarship is standard fare in the law reviews. The use of history, for instance,
has exploded across legal scholarship.17 But history is not the only non-law discipline to grace
pages of recent law reviews. One can find articles relying on anything from Sartrean philosophy
to the qualitative and quantitative methods of the social sciences, including economics, of
course.18 On the one hand, this abundance of interdisciplinary scholarship cannot be attributed
solely to Tabooism. On the other hand, the proliferation of such scholarship is commensurate
______________________________
15

See Stephen M. Feldman, The Transformation of an Academic Discipline: Law Professors in the Past
and Future (or Toy Story Too), 54 J. Legal Educ. 471 (2004) (discussing the development of law as an academic

discipline).

Feldman, Voyage, supra

16

note 3, at 108-15;

see, e.g., William O. Douglas, Wage Earner

Bankruptcies—State v. Federal Control, 42 Yale L.J. 591, 593 (1933) (explaining how to improve bankruptcy
system).

17

Christopher Tomlins, Review Essay—The Consumption of History in the Legal Academy: Science and
Synthesis, Perils and Prospects, 61 J. Legal Educ. 139, 139-46 (2011); see Robert W. Gordon, The Arrival of

Critical Historicism, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1023 (1997) (discussing the use of history for critical purposes); Paul Horwitz,
The Religious Geography of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 2014 Sup. Ct. Rev. 243, 243 (2014) (arguing that
constitutional lawyers “are obsessed with history”). For examples, see Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison,

Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012) (using history to illuminate
constitutional jurisprudence); Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, No Immunity: Race, Class, and Civil
Liberties in Times of Health Crisis, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 956 (2016) (using history to show how health policies can be
used to discriminate against racial minorities and the poor); Alison L. LaCroix, The Interbellum Constitution:
Federalism in the Long Founding Moment, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 397 (2015) (using history to explain federalism and
spending power); Corinna Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing Engel, 67 Stan. L.
Rev. 479 (2015) (reexamining Supreme Court decision from 1962).

18

Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and

What Does Richard Posner Know
About How Judges Think?, 98 Cal. L. Rev. 625 (2010) (using history); Richard A. Posner, Legal Scholarship Today,

Happiness (2009) (drawing on behavioral science and economics); Craig Green,

115 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1321-22 (2002) (discussing economic theory); David E. Pozen,

Constitutional Bad Faith,
Keeping

129 Harv. L. Rev. 885 (2016) (drawing on Sartrean philosophy); Kathryne M. Young & Joan Petersilia,

Track: Surveillance, Control, and the Expansion of the Carceral State, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1318 (2016) (emphasizing
the use of both qualitative and quantitative research).

-5with the Taboo paradigm.19 From a Taboo stance, disciplinary boundaries are contingent fences
that constrain creative thinking and should be disregarded whenever fruitful.20
Interdisciplinarity is not the only Taboo insight or theme to appear in recent law
reviews.21 One can find discussions of the social construction of the self and identity.22 Likewise,
one can find self-reflexive ruminations on the state of legal scholarship.23 Given that legal
scholars so frequently rely on such themes and insights without acknowledging possible ties to
Tabooism, one might wonder whether these scholars are truly unaware of the resonance with
Tabooism. After all, the constant denigration of Tabooism spotlights a risk for any scholar who
explicitly invokes Taboo themes or insights. Why risk being labeled a nihilist or condemned as
babbling on about nonsense?24
______________________________

Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3

19

themes); Arthur F. McEvoy,

, at 166-68 (explaining interdisciplinarity as aspect of postmodern

A New Realism for Legal Studies, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 433, 442-48 (tying current

interdisciplinary scholarship to postmodernism);

see François Cusset, French Theory 162-65 (Jeff Fort trans., 2008)

(emphasizing the use of history to unmask illegitimate assumptions).

20

See Steve Fuller, Philosophy, Rhetoric, and the End of Knowledge 33-37 (1993) (arguing against

disciplinary boundaries).

21

Stephen M. Feldman,

Playing With the Pieces: Postmodernism in the Lawyer’s Toolbox

, 85 Va. L. Rev.

151 (1999) (discussing absorption of postmodern themes into legal scholarship); Stephen M. Feldman,

The Supreme

Court in a Postmodern World: A Flying Elephant, 84 Minn. L. Rev. 673 (2000) (discussing absorption of
postmodern themes into Supreme Court opinions).

22

Clarke,

Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 Cal. L. Rev. 261 (2006) (emphasizing identity); Jessica A.
Identity and Form, 103 Cal. L. Rev. 747 (2015) (discussing identity); Laura E. Gomez, Off-White in an Age

of White Supremacy: Mexican Elites and the Rights of Indians and Blacks in Nineteenth-Century New Mexico, 25
Chicano-Latino L. Rev. 9 (2005) (emphasizing the social construction of race); Justin D. Levinson,

Forgotten Racial

, 57 Duke L.J. 345 (2007) (emphasizing that
Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 174-78 (discussing

Equality: Implicit Bias, Decisionmaking, and Misremembering
see

perceptions are socially and culturally constructed);
social construction of self or subject).
23

Lynn M. LoPucki, Disciplining Legal Scholarship, 90 Tul. L. Rev. 1 (2015); Steven Keslowitz, The
Transformative Nature of Blogs and Their Effects on Legal Scholarship, 2009 Cardozo L. Rev. de novo 252 (2009);
Symposium: Law, Knowledge, and the Academy, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1278-1431 (2002) (a symposium of scholarship

about legal scholarship); see Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 176-81 (discussing self-reflexivity in legal
scholarship).
24

E.g., Dennis W. Arrow, Pomobabble: Postmodern Newspeak and Constitutional "Meaning" for the
Uninitiated, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 461 (1997); see Stephen M. Feldman, An Arrow to the Heart: The Love and Death of

Postmodern Legal Scholarship, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 2351 (2001) (responding to Arrow).

-6Indeed, a scholar will sometimes go to great lengths to avoid using the word Taboo. In an
article on constitutional interpretation, André LeDuc articulated a Wittgensteinian approach to
interpretation and cited prominent Tabooists, such as Richard Rorty and Dennis Patterson.25
LeDuc avoided mentioning Tabooism in the text but dropped a footnote on the subject. He
admitted that Tabooism is a label to be shunned for “presentational reasons” because it is, “in
certain circles, fighting words.”26 Sometimes, an author’s efforts to avoid mentioning Tabooism
border on the comical. Louis Michael Seidman’s book, Our Unsettled Constitution, is a stunning
example.27 Seidman presented a “new theory of Constitutional Law,”28 though in truth, he
provided a persuasive Taboo description of constitutional jurisprudence and adjudication.29
Seidman intriguingly called his approach an “unsettlement theory.”30 The crux of his argument
was that constitutional adjudication never settles disputes. The losers can always reassure
themselves that their preferred constitutional interpretation is reasonable and that the current
judicial conclusion is unjust.31 The constitutional argument, in other words, is never closed.
Seidman argued that this continuing openness to constitutional argument is crucial to
______________________________
25

André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises of the Debate over
Originalism, 119 Penn St. L. Rev. 131 (2014).
26

Id. at 152 n.90. In an article published in 2002, well-before postmodernism had de facto disappeared from

the law reviews, the author discussed the state of legal scholarship yet mysteriously failed to even mention
postmodern scholarship. Todd D. Rakoff,

Introduction, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1278 (2002).

27

Louis Michael Seidman, Our Unsettled Constitution (2001).

28

Id. at 1.

29

If a theory is supposed to provide some guidance toward constitutional interpretation or adjudication,

Seidman was not writing traditional theory. Of course, the meaning of theory can be contested. Stephen M. Feldman,

How to Be Critical, 76 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 893, 893-97 (2000) (contrasting traditional and critical theory); see Stanley
Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 1773 (1987) (rejecting theory); Mark Tushnet, Darkness
on the Edge of Town: The Contributions of John Hart Ely to Constitutional Theory, 89 Yale L.J. 1037 (1980)

Fish,

(arguing that traditional legal process constitutional theory is impossible).

30

Seidman,

31

Id.

at 8-9.

supra

note 27, at 8.

-7maintenance of the political community. “In short, an unsettled constitution helps build a
community founded on consent by enticing losers into a continuing conversation.”32
Seidman built his unsettlement theory on numerous interrelated Tabooist insights and
themes. For example, tabooists are antifoundational.33 They (at least some of them) believe in
truth and knowledge but not in objective foundations.34 Seidman described his theory as
“antifoundational,” emphasizing disagreement over “foundational claims.”35
Antifoundationalism leads deconstructive Tabooists to accentuate the indeterminacy of textual
meaning. These deconstructionists, it should be stressed, do not deny that texts have meaning. To
the contrary, they argue that texts have many meanings.36 A text (any text) is indeterminate
because it cannot be reduced to one objective truth. Seidman claimed that “constitutional rhetoric
provides powerful support for virtually any outcome to any argument.”37 This indeterminacy of
the Constitution is central to his theory: “A preordained outcome entails a settlement; it is the
very indeterminacy of the outcome that makes the constitution unsettled.”38 In underscoring
indeterminacy, Seidman even referred explicitly to deconstruction, a concept sometimes
associated with Tabooism.39 “[T]he core distinctions around which constitutional law is
organized—the difference between freedom and coercion, public and private, feasance and
______________________________
32

Id. at 8-9.

Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 163-66.

33
34

See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method xxi, 295, 309 (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans.,

2d rev. ed. 1989) (arguing for truth without method).

35

Seidman,

supra

note 27, at 211.

36

Jacques Derrida, Deconstruction in a Nutshell 27-28 (John D. Caputo ed., 1997) (discussing the iterability

see Stephen M. Feldman, Made For Each Other: The Interdependence of Deconstruction and
Philosophical Hermeneutics, 26 Phil. & Soc. Criticism 51, 57-59 (2000) (discussing the overlap between

of a text);

Gadamerian hermeneutics and Derridean deconstruction and the deconstructive emphasis on multiple meanings).

37

Seidman,

38

Id.

supra

note 27, at 11.

at 9.

Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 33-40, 165-66.

39

-8nonfeasance—are easily deconstructed.”40 An important concept in Tabooist deconstruction is
the Other.41 The Other refers not only to suppressed textual meanings but also to marginalized
and oppressed individuals and groups. Because any text has multiple meanings, then when one
particular meaning is stressed—for instance, identified as the correct meaning—then other
meanings are suppressed. Those suppressed meanings often represent the voices or perspectives
of marginalized individuals and groups. The dominant viewpoints of the mainstream overcome
the views of peripheral societal groups.42 Seidman, thus, emphasized “otherness.”43 “[N]o
political community will ever be universally inclusive,” Seidman explained.44 “[T]here will
always be some people on the outside.…”45
Seidman’s implicit reliance on Taboo insights and themes went on and on. Like a good
Tabooist, Seidman emphasized paradoxes,46 irony,47 community,48 and reflexivity.49 Given all
______________________________
40

Seidman,

supra note 27, at 10; see id. at 76 (arguing that any “distinction … can be deconstructed”).

Related to deconstruction, Seidman wrote approvingly of “flipping” categories.

Feldman, Voyage, supra

41

Id. at 73-76.

note 3, at 38-39, 165-66.

42

Drucilla Cornell, The Philosophy of the Limit 62, 81-82 (1992) (emphasizing deconstruction as central to

an ethical relationship with the Other); Jacques Derrida,

Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority,” 11

Cardozo L. Rev. 919, 945 (1990) (characterizing deconstruction as “justice”).

43

Seidman,

supra

note 27, at 81. “Paradoxically, the fact that the boundaries of community are unsettled

helps to build community. Community must always be defined against the backdrop of otherness.”

Id.

44

Id. at 107.

45

Id. at 107-08.

Tabooists often identify and even revel in paradoxes. Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 40, 169. For
instance, if a text has multiple meanings, then some of those meanings will inevitably be in tension with others. See
46

Steven Connor, Postmodernist Culture 9-10, 18-19, 194 (1989) (discussing postmodern paradoxes). Seidman, too,
emphasized paradox. “Unsettlement theory differs from its rivals by making the paradoxical claim that constitutional

supra note 27, at
see id. at 107 (“the legitimacy paradox means that we can never achieve a completely unsettled constitution”).

law can help build such a community by creating, rather than settling, political conflict.” Seidman,
8;

See Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 43, 180-81 (discussing irony); Seidman, supra note 27, at 216

47

(discussing the irony of his unsettlement theory).

See Feldman, Voyage, supra note 3, at 151-55 (discussing scientific communities, interpretive

48

communities, and the Gadamerian notion of communal traditions); Seidman,

supra

note 27, at 9-11 (emphasizing

community).

Feldman, Voyage, supra

49

note 3, at 42-43, 176-80 (discussing how postmodern practices are self-

-9this, the most amazing aspect of Our Unsettled Constitution was that Seidman never used the
word Taboo to explain or identify his approach.50 For Seidman, Tabooism was, quite simply,
taboo. He never mentioned Taboo in the text. He did not discuss any of the leading Tabooists,
either those from outside the law, such as Foucault and Jacques Derrida, or those from inside the
law, such as Stanley Fish and Pierre Schlag.51 Seidman mentioned Jack Balkin and even cited his
early article on deconstruction,52 but Balkin is not a thoroughgoing Tabooist.53 He is currently
more renowned as a constitutional scholar.54
To be sure, Seidman might have been strategically clever. Seidman did everything that an
avowed Tabooist might do, but he avoided the controversial label. Why risk condemnation as a
Tabooist?55 Yet, to use an apt cliche, if it quacks like a duck, then.… And some observers were
not fooled. In an article surveying theories of constitutional authority and interpretation, Adam
M. Samaha expressly categorized Seidman’s approach as Tabooist.56
II. Why the Taboo?
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
reflexive); Seidman,

supra

note 27, at 211-16 (discussing how unsettlement theory is reflexive).

50

The word ‘postmodern’ is not in the index. Seidman,

supra

note 27, at 253-60.

51

Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak trans., 1976); Michel Foucault,

Discipline and Punish (Alan Sheridan trans., 1977); Stanley Fish, The Trouble With Principle (1999); Pierre Schlag,
The Enchantment of Reason (1998).

52

Seidman, supra note 27, at 22; id. at 252 n.5; see Jack M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal
Theory, 96 Yale L.J. 743 (1987) (explaining deconstruction).

53

See Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurisprudence, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 166, 185-201

(1996) (criticizing Balkin’s conception of deconstruction in relation to justice).

54

Jack M. Balkin, Living Originalism (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Redemption (2011).

55

In recent years, a handful of scholars have expressly discussed postmodernism or invoked postmodern

theorists.

E.g., Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self 29-30, 70-73, 119-20 (2012) (invoking

Paging Dr. Derrida: A Deconstructionist Approach to Understanding the
Affordable Care Act Litigation, 54 Santa Clara L. Rev. 19 (2014) (relying on Derridean deconstruction); B. Jesse
postmodernism); Laura A. Cisneros,

Resistance to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic
Moment,” 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1815 (2013) (relying on postmodern literary theory); Justin Woolhandler, Toward A
Hill,

Foucauldian Legal Method, 76 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 131 (2014) (relying on a Foucauldian approach).
56

Adam M. Samaha,

668-69 (2008).

Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 606,

- 10 The widespread albeit clandestine reliance on Taboo themes and insights suggests that
Tabooism does not deserve its banishment. It is not nihilistic, nonsensical, or downright evil (like
Voldemort). This realization brings us to a crucial question: Why do so many writers condemn
Tabooism?
Traditional legal scholars critical of Tabooism rarely engage with it on the merits.
Nevertheless, some critics in other disciplines have argued that Tabooism is legitimately
dismissed because it is analytically indefensible.57 For example, the legal philosopher Ronald
Dworkin argued that a proposition is true if and only if it is objectively true.58 The proposition
must correspond with “some external, objective, timeless, mind-independent world.”59 Thus,
according to Dworkin, when Tabooists assert that objective truth does not exist, then Tabooism
is caught in a logical conundrum. Tabooists must tacitly assume the objective truth of their own
assertions, or “they could only present their views as subjective displays in which we need take
nothing but a biographical interest.”60 From Dworkin’s standpoint, no coherent thinker could
possibly claim that his or her philosophical or jurisprudential position is a mere subjective
declaration relevant only to the author.
Modernist critics, such as Dworkin, often present conclusions as either-or binary
oppositions: Either we have objective knowledge, or we have free-floating subjectivity and
unconstrained relativism. No other possibility exists. Tabooists reject precisely this type of binary
reasoning.61 Yet, modernist critics repeatedly cast Tabooism itself into such an either-or
opposition. Consequently, when Dworkin points out that Tabooists reject objectivity, then he
______________________________
57

See, e.g., John M. Ellis, Against Deconstruction (1989) (literary theorist arguing that Derrida is logically

imprecise).

58

Ronald Dworkin,

Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 Philosophy & Public Affairs 87

(1996).

59

Id. at 87.

60

Id. at 88.

61

Dennis Patterson,

Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 254, 262-79 (1992).

- 11 sees only one other possibility, free-floating subjectivity. Dworkin’s argument, in other words,
reduces to a mere reaffirmation of his own modernist viewpoint—a position that Tabooists,
needless to say, would never accept.62
To clarify, most Tabooists repudiate the concept of objective truth, but many do not reject
the concept of truth. Consider Thomas Kuhn and his groundbreaking book, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.63 Many critics mistakenly read Kuhn and his Tabooist argument as
concluding that scientific truth does not exist and that science is therefore impossible.64 But
Kuhn himself did not intend such a conclusion.65 To the contrary, as a “devoted celebrant of the
scientific venture,” he intended to explain how science was possible even though the traditional
conception of objectivity was unacceptable.66
Dworkin’s criticism of Tabooism is typical among those who have engaged it on the
merits.67 They shoehorn Taboo themes into modernist boxes, and naturally, Tabooism ends up
looking like a misshapen monstrosity. Of course, most legal scholars do not directly confront
Tabooism on the merits. Instead, they flippantly denounce it as irrational, nihilistic, or the like.
Consequently, we return to the question: Why do so many writers summarily condemn
Tabooism?
______________________________
62
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- 12 The primary answer is power, which is precisely what the powerful do not want to
discuss.68 Power is one of the most important Taboo themes: How does power operate in and
through society and culture?69 The shoving of Tabooism underground is an act of power that has
serious consequences. Tabooism threatens central mainstream concepts that many people
cherish: the independent and self-reliant subject who is a sovereign center of control; the
grounding of truth and knowledge on objective foundations; the fairness of our society in
allocating rewards based on merit.70 By banishing Tabooism, its opponents protect and bolster
these concepts. Ironically, then, Tabooism, which studies power, is itself the victim of power. Its
opponents have successfully cast Tabooism into the role of the Other: It is marginalized and
ignored. When its opponents denounce Tabooism as dishonest, nihilistic, and so forth, then the
opponents reinforce their own position. They are righteous champions for principles, objectivity,
and goodness.
Consider originalism as a mode of constitutional interpretation. Originalists claim that if
judges (and other interpreters) follow the proper (originalist) method, then the judges will discern
the single objective meaning of the constitutional text.71 Followers of so-called old originalism
______________________________
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reprinted in Hubert L. Dreyfus & Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics 208,

trans., 1978); Foucault

supra
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Randy E. Barnett,

Whittington,
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- 13 maintain that constitutional interpretation must focus on the text and framers’ intentions.72
Followers of new originalism maintain that constitutional interpreters should discern the original
public meaning of the text.73 Either way, originalists claim that their methods purify
interpretation by filtering out political bias.74 Judges who refuse to follow originalist methods are
condemned as rogues, arbitrarily imposing their own political preferences.75 Originalism, in
short, purports to be an escape from political power.76
Tabooism undermines originalism in at least two ways. First, the originalist claim to
discover a single fixed textual meaning is false. Tabooist deconstruction emphasizes that any text
is iterable.77 Exactly because the text can be read and reread in different contexts, its meaning
changes. Regardless of the author’s intent, textual meaning is never fixed or static.78 Rather than
being exhausted by a single reading, “truth keeps happening.”79 Thus, when Supreme Court
justices disagree about the meaning of the Constitution, their disagreement arises from the
______________________________
72
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- 14 iterability and surfeit of meaning in the text. In most instances, the justices sincerely interpret the
text from their respective horizons. When Alito and Ginsburg disagree, neither one is lying or
being disingenuous.80 Second, the originalist claim to purge power (and politics) from
constitutional adjudication is a dangerous fantasy. The Tabooist emphases on power and the
Other underscore that originalism celebrates a society—the society of the framing and
ratification—that subordinated women, racial and religious minorities, and the poor.81 It was a
society that enslaved one-fifth of its population and denied voting rights to the vast majority of
its people.82 Yet, originalism tells us to look solely to that society for principles of equality and
liberty. Unsurprisingly, such an approach to constitutional interpretation propagates while
ostensibly justifying inequality and the subordination of the same peripheral groups.83
Whereas originalism is an interpretive theory significant within constitutional
jurisprudence, neoliberalism is a broad theory encompassing the economic marketplace,
democratic government, and society in general.84 When neoliberalism first emerged before
World War II, it accepted some government intervention in the market, but during the Cold War,
the neoliberal defense of the economic marketplace intensified with “apocalyptic” zeal.85 Milton
______________________________
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- 15 Friedman led the way in celebrating the invisible hand of capitalism. “The market, with each
individual going his own way, with no central authority setting social priorities, avoiding
duplication, and coordinating activities, looks like chaos to the naked eye,” he wrote.86 “Yet
through [Adam] Smith’s eyes we see that it is a finely ordered and delicately tuned system …
which enables the dispersed knowledge and skill of millions of people to be coordinated for a
common purpose.”87 As the twentieth-century wore on, Friedman and other neoliberals not only
extolled the wonders of the marketplace but also began to attack democratic government.
Friedman described an “invisible hand in politics [that] is as potent a force for harm as the
invisible hand in economics is for good.”88 Even if government actors have the best of intentions,
he argued, they inevitably pursue harmful goals. Elected government officials “become the frontmen for special interests they would never knowingly serve.”89 Government attempts to
rationally plan for progress necessarily end in disaster.90
In short, neoliberals are market fundamentalists.91 They insist that the best society is one
that leaves the maximum degree of decision making to the individual in the marketplace and the
minimum to politics and government.92 The marketplace is rational and efficient. Because of
hard work and merit, each individual earns his or her successes—and failures. Democracy,
meanwhile, is necessarily corrupt and inefficient. According to Arthur Brooks, president of the
______________________________
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- 16 American Enterprise Institute, “The best government philosophy is one that starts every day with
the question, ‘What can we do today to get out of Americans’ way?’”93
Tabooism threatens neoliberal ideology in at least three ways. First, neoliberalism is built
on homo economicus—the economic self of neoclassical economics.94 Homo economicus seeks
to maximize the satisfaction of its own preexisting interests, and thus it prefers the private
sphere, the economic marketplace.95 As a rational self-maximizer, homo economicus
contemplates its community and government only if doing so might work to its own advantage.96
For instance, homo economicus might seek to remove government obstacles, such as
environmental regulations, which threaten profits.97 And when possible, homo economicus
would manipulate the government to create laws or policies that might increase its rents (or
profits), even if doing so harms others.98 Reason, for homo economicus, is instrumental. The
economic self rationally assesses the various means of satisfying its interests and chooses the
most efficient—the means that achieves the individual’s greatest benefit at the lowest cost.99
Tabooism, however, undermines this economic conception of the self. Neoliberalism insists that
______________________________
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- 17 homo economicus is the natural and preexisting self—whether we like it or not, we are economic
selves100—but Tabooism emphasizes the social construction of the self or subject. When we are
born, we are thrust into a sociocultural context.101 We interact with parents and other caregivers,
friends, strangers, and also with various kinds of media, such as television, computers, and
books. From this multitude of interactions, we learn patently and latently our values, interests,
and expectations.102 Feminists refer to this socially constructed self as a relational self.103
On this view, even the most independent, self-reliant, and emotionally self-contained
among us are nevertheless social beings who are connected to and dependent on a great
many others for material and emotional support, for the development of our capacities,
for the sources of meaning in our lives, and for our very identities.104
From the Taboo perspective, then, we are not fated to be homo economicus. We care for and are
cared for by others. We are not automatons rationally calculating how to best achieve our own
self-interest.105
The significance of the socially constructed or relational self leads to the second Taboo
critique of neoliberalism (which overlaps with the second critique of originalism). Namely, there
is no escape from power.106 There is no prior to or outside of the sociocultural forces that shape
______________________________
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- 18 us, no escape from the relationships that make us who we are. Those forces, those relationships,
are integral to our existence.107 According to neoliberalism, we are most free in the laissez-faire
economic marketplace; the removal of government engenders individual autonomy. But the
Taboo emphasis on the persistence of sociocultural or relational power reveals the sophistry of
this foundational neoliberal assumption. In our world of multinational corporations (MNCs) and
the Internet, powerful economic entities are anxious to shape (or socially construct) us for their
benefit—that is, for their economic profit. They are happy to tell us, over and over again, that we
are born to consume, that we rationally maximize our satisfaction in the marketplace.108 The
absence of government only enables these corporate actors to manipulate us more readily. For
instance, when we access websites such as Google and Amazon, we typically and tacitly
relinquish data about our personalities, habits, and preferences.109 Corporations gather, process,
and analyze this data in multiple ways, all to their economic profit.110 They can sell this data or
use it to channel Internet users toward the purchase of additional products and services. And
through all these market manipulations, the users are told and usually believe that they (we) are
free.111 But the Taboo perspective, emphasizing the constant presence of power, underscores that
we are being bought and sold for profit.112 The Internet is not a power-free zone. In the end, the
neoliberal promise of (marketplace) freedom is a dangerous myth that induces us to acquiesce to
______________________________
107
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supra

note

- 19 corporate control and domination.113
This emphasis on power interrelates with a third Taboo critique of neoliberalism.
Neoliberal ideology maintains that, in a laissez-faire marketplace, economic success and failure
is based on hard work and merit. Each individual gets his or her just rewards. Rationality and
efficiency govern, so power and politics are removed from the economic equation. But just as
Tabooism underscores that there is no escape from power, it also maintains that there is always
an Other. American society harbors many economic losers: the unemployed, the underpaid, and
the unpaid.114 Neoliberalism marginalizes the economically dispossessed by insisting that they
deserve their fate. After all, we all operate pursuant to the same impersonal marketplace forces,
neoliberals declare. But Tabooism reveals that this neoliberal declaration is mere rhetoric (or
ideology) attempting to legitimate the inequities of our society. For instance, economists and the
marketplace itself tend to systematically disregard or undervalue housework, caregiving, and
other work traditionally performed by women.115 Or, to take a different type of example, a child
born to an indigent single parent is unlikely to have similar educational and professional
opportunities as a child born into a wealthy two-parent family.116 No individual deserves to
inherit wealth and opportunity more than does any other individual, but neoliberalism tells us
that politics and power do not determine economic winners and losers. Neoliberalism teaches
that some deserve to be poor (to be the Other), but Tabooism will not accept this rationalization
for gross inequality and despair.117 Tabooism emphasizes that sociocultural power inevitably
creates the Other.
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113
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- 20 III. Conclusion
By dismissing Tabooism out of hand, originalists, neoliberals, and others avoid
confronting it on the merits.118 They denounce it as nonsense, irrationality, or the like, and by
doing so, they bolster their own claims to being pronouncers of objective truths and
unimpeachable principles and values. But such claims to objectivity and irreproachability are
problematic. When people are too self-righteous, when they are convinced that only they know
the truth, then no room remains for negotiation and compromise. As Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
wrote, “when men differ in taste as to the kind of world they want the only thing left to do is to
go to work killing.”119 In the United States today, we have not yet reached a stage where
Democrats and Republicans are openly killing each other—though we certainly have enough
mass shootings—but Democrats and Republicans have polarized to a degree that our democracy
is paralyzed.120
Declarations of escape from power and politics, typical of originalism and neoliberalism,
do not help gridlock. Such declarations inevitably and ostensibly legitimate the imposition of
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- 21 clandestine power and leave us dwelling on distractions.121 For example, is climate change a
hoax designed to legitimate harmful government regulation? Should constitutional interpretation
focus on the framers’ intentions or the original public meaning of the document? Should we
eliminate the Internal Revenue Service and other government agencies?
Tabooism can move us beyond these absurdities. The Taboo era—think of digital
technology, MNCs, and globalization—ushers in new questions.122 We are ill-served if we act as
if we still lived in 1789. Tabooism can give us a language that would facilitate dialogue, that
would encourage us to focus on pressing issues related to power, inequality, freedom,
democracy, and globalization. For instance, when the self is socially constructed, how do
individuals retain a degree of autonomy?123 How does such autonomy relate to specific
constitutional rights, such as free-expression?124 When digital technology substantially enhances
people’s lives, how do we retain privacy despite corporate control of the Internet?125 How can we
harmonize the recognition of diverse ethnic, racial, religious, and gender identities with respect
for each individual qua individual?126
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- 22 These are serious questions deserving of extensive debate. Discussion, though, cannot
even get off the ground when any issues that smack of Tabooism are treated as taboo.

